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Political Games of Users and MIS Professionals
in the Information System Development Process
Ling-hsing Chang, Department of MIS, National Sun Yat-san University, zubada@kcg.gov.tw
Tung-ching Lin, Department of MIS, National Sun Yat-san University, tclin@mis.nsysu.edu.tw
Abstract
Although Grover et al. (1988) have done empirical
research on political behavior in ISD, it was limited to the
behavior of users, and without taking into consideration the
character of organizations; neither did they make structural
classifications. Among the many questions to be explored,
the organizational culture must be a key issue affecting
political behavior. This kind of research is scarce, especially
in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to find out: in ISD,
what political behavior will take place in which stage, and
by whom it is caused. What kind of business characters
would affect political behavior and to what degree? And
how different political behavior, such as deviation of goals,
dissipation of energies, and diversion of resources, would
affect the whole organization. This paper expects to offer
some guidelines to the practices in ISD.

Information System Development (ISD) necessarily
involves resource reallocation in the organization.
Resistance to the development process often arises as a
result of disagreements stemming from differing goals
among various parties within the organization. Resistance
usually appears in political forms, which means that users or
the MIS professionals may exhibit some unnecessary,
irrational behaviors purely out of self -interest. Such
political behavior distorts resource allocations, misguides
project goals, and plays havoc with schedules and budgets.
This study focuses on the following areas. (1) In ISD, which
political behavior typically takes place in which
development stage, and by whom it is caused? (2) What
kind of business characteristics, such as the organizational
culture, would affect political behavior and to what degree?
And (3) how do different political behavior, such as
deviation from goals, dissipation of energies, and diversion
of resources, affect the whole organization? By this detailed
discussion, the study seeks to make system developers
aware of what irrational behavior might appear in the course
of development, so that they can reduce or prevent any
negative consequences.
Keywords: Information System Development (ISD),
political behavior.

PRIOR RESEARCH
Kreitner and Kinicki (1997) believe that political
maneuvering is triggered primarily by uncertainty. Five
common sources of uncertainty within organizations are: (1)
unclear objectives, (2) vague performance measuring, (3)
ill-defined decision processes, (4) strong individual or
group competition, and (5) any type of change. Whenever
change is attempted, the political subsystem becomes
active. (Raia, 1985).
There is legitimate and illegitimate political behavior,
the legitimate behavior can inhibit unreasonable policies
(Robbins, 1979; Moberg, 1978; Madison et al, 1980), but
people in general focus their attention on the adverse effect
of the political behavior. Patricia (1995) finds that political
behavior is typically divisive and conflictive, often pitting
individuals or groups against formal authority, or else
against each other. Mintzberg (1984) believe that it has a
negative effect on interpersonal relationships, performance
and productivity.
But what factors affect political behavior? Robbins
(1979) finds that the personal characters (such as high
degree locus of control etc.) and organization characters
(such as relocation of resource, low trust, etc.) can
encourage political behavior. The political behavior process
framework is developed through antecedent conditions,
operating mechanisms, and outcomes (Verdenburgh &
Maurer, 1984).
The development of information systems brings
representatives of user and data processing departments
together under conditions of resource pressure and time

INTRODUCTION
Beenman (1987) believes that in anything involving
humans, political behavior will arise, and rational
expectations, directions, and goals may be distorted.
Organization members interpreted politics as being
deleterious to morale, as indirectly related to inferior
organizational performance outcomes, and as a source of
organizational control in the form of negative feedback
loops (Voyer, 1994). In these complicated human
interactions, political behavior might occur just to protect
self-interest at the expense of business goals. However,
most of the studies on MIS are based on theories of Rational
School and try to find out what is the best methodology for
ISD. There are few studies, especially about political
behavior, based on theories of Behavioral School. Recently,
the political view of organizations has assumed greater
stature in organization theory. This perspective interprets
organizational events not only from the rational standpoint,
but also in terms of negotiation and conflicting goals (Robey,
1984).
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causes and towards the achievement of the parochial
objectives of the individual parties involved.
Keen (1981) finds that the resistances of users are due to
perceived threats to their political interests. Keen (1981)
suggests that MIS professionals raise their political
awareness. But he also finds MIS professionals are the
protagonists in several games. Recognition of hidden
motives and devious strategies can be a first step before
applying techniques to prevent future games or favorably
resolving current games.

constraints. These departments may differ considerably in
formal structure, training, cognitive orientation of members,
career paths, and departmental mission. The potential for
conflict in ISD is therefore great, and potential
disagreements are likely to become manifest under
conditions of high interdependence among group members
in project meetings (Robey, 1989). The political campaigns
can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are
equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of
power (Robey, 1989).
Lucas (1974) believes that the real problem from the
design of IS at the organizational level is associated with an
intangible variable, power. The information analyst must
therefore recognize that the ISD process within an
organization might be accompanied by a dynamic shift in
power and power-dependence relations (Swanson, 1985).
Dickson & Wetherbe (1985) find that “the change of power
and politics” is one of the key issues of the successful IS
implementation. Building a new system and changing the
existing system are a political process; both could cause
disorder in the power of an organization and social structure.
According to Markus (1983), deliberate resistance to
information system implementation occurs when the power
distribution implied by a proposed system is incongruous
with that determined by other sources of power. In other
words, those who expect to gain power support
implementation while those who expect to lose power resist
it.
Treating ISD as a political process appears to disregard
legitimate superordinate goals that may have guided initial
system proposals. The most skeptical position is to mistrust
all appeals to superordinate goals and to suspect that
individuals are motivated only by their own interests (Robey,
1993). Hence the technical system analysis must be
augmented with a social or political analysis. A political
analysis focuses on processes of control, influence, and the
use of power in organization life. The political campaigns
can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are
equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of
power. (Kling, 1984).
Keen (1981) has analyzed the political games in ISD, and
using the classification of Bardach (1977), divided these
games into four categories: (1) Deflection of goals: the
originally stated goals of an MIS project might be
ambiguous and therefore subject to change. (2) Dilemmas
of administration: the MIS implementation process requires
the assembly of a number of diverse resources from various
parties. The parties might take advantage of this dependence
by threatening to withhold their support and thus forcing the
managers to either meet their demands or to proceed
without their resources. (3) Dissipation of energies:
individuals and groups waste considerable energy either by
avoiding responsibility or by attempting to gain power and
control. These games lead to project delays and poor
performance. (4) Diversion of resources: the games in this
category result in deflection of resources away from useful

METHOD OF RESEARCH
There is little research on political games and their effect
on ISD. We need therefore to further explore the key issues
and their interactions in the complicated MIS development
process. So this paper uses the methodology of a case study
to figure out and analyze the questions of “why,” “how,”
“what,” “when” and “who”.
The purpose of this article is to find the political
behaviors in ISD, to classify the games and to analyze how
they affect the IS. Here six organizations are chosen for
study. These cases have had MIS departments for more
than ten years. They include different kinds of
manufacturing and service industries, both large and
small-scale, government and private enterprises, and
commercial and nonprofit businesses. We can expect to
find many political games from these cases. (Table 1.)
Table 1 Introduction of the cases
Case Organization type
Individuals
code
in MIS dept.
A Company - Food
manufacturer
B Company - Financier

70-80

C Company - Steel
manufacturer
D Company - Common
carrier
E Government agency

20-30

F

60-70

Company Manufacturer

30-40

30-40
40-50

Public/
Private
business
Private
enterprise
Private
enterprise
Private
enterprise
Government
enterprise
Government
enterprise
Government
enterprise

Our research, based on the Robbins (1979),
Verdenburgh and Maurer (1984) political behavior process
framework, introduces three constructs to the
semi-structured interview questionnaire. These are (1)
organization factors, (2) political behavior and (3) the
affects on the IS project.
In using the Content Analysis method to analyze the data,
prior research has shown the categorization and analysis
steps to be the most critical Therefore we defined each
category very clearly to avoid misclassification. And we
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results were accepted and disagreed-upon parts were
discussed in more detail. If at least two persons agreed on a
conclusion t, then it was accepted. Otherwise it was
discussed with the MIS expert (professor of MIS). If there
was still not agreement, then the conclusion was eliminated.
By this procedure the themes selected and the reliability of
the analysis unit should be acceptable.

analyzed interview data using thematic units. These were
introduced from the respondents' description of the relevant
events in the IS project development process. After
selecting the relevant sentences, the themes could be
analyzed. This the researchers did by collecting these
themes, and coding and categorizing them. Since coding is
subjective, it is necessary that all coding persons agree
about the code data. Then the researchers calculate the
reliability of the code and judge the explanation of the
category.
The researchers selected the themes in the respondents'
descriptions and highlighted them. Three persons (graduate
students) independently collected these themes, coding and
categorizing them based on the interview record, after
which they compared and analyzed the results. Agreed-upon

Political game
1. Up for grabs

2. Keeping others
on the trot

3. Leaving others in
the lurch
4. Leading an easy
life

5. Providing lip
service
6. Protecting one’s
territory

7. Over-icing the
cake

8. Boycotting

9. Passing the buck

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Identification of The Political Games
After interviews, we have found 31 political games that
occur in IS planning, development and implementation
processes (Table 2); for the details of these games, please
refer to Chang (1997).

Table 2 Classification of political games and their effects
Description
Effect

Classification of
effect
Grab control before the project goal Turn the goal to a different purpose Deflection of
Goals
becomes concrete, then change project and miss the original intent.
direction.
When the project is ongoing, put forward Keep the project from achieving the Dilemmas of
many unnecessary requests.
goal on time, resulting in failure.
Administration,
Dissipation of
Energies
Don’t wish to see the success of the Deter the execution of the project, Dilemmas of
project and do not give necessary support. and try to cancel it.
Administration
Dilemmas of
Object to or delay any change, just to Deter the implementation of the
Administration
avoid work or responsibility. The pretext project.
is: it doesn’t pay to utilize a lot of
resources and give the organization too
great a shock but bring in no benefits.
Pretend to support the project, but Deter the implementation of the
Dilemmas of
actually contribute little.
project.
Administration
Toward the end, when the project proves Seize information resources to get Diversion of
successful, departments contend with self-interest, delay the project and Resources
each other for resources, thus waste energies.
self-consuming energies without regard to
the goals of the company.
Exaggerate the efforts and contributions Seize resources to protect oneself
Diversion of
of one’s own department so as to earn and benefit, while distorting the
Resources
merits and demand more resources or project resource allocation.
insist it's time for others to contribute.
Reject the project until some particular To seize resources, waste energy in Dissipation of
Energies,
interests are satisfied.
negotiation, communication,
competition, and pacification. Then Diversion of
Resources
the project can't go smoothly.
Pass the hot potatoes on to others; put Pervert the design and job allocation Dilemmas of
Administration
one’s own duty onto others and force of the project, and deter the
others to take the responsibility for implementation.
failure.
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10. Tying two strings Do not work with all their energy when Deter the implementation of the
to one bow
the project is ongoing. Escape the project and pervert the goal of the
responsibility if something goes wrong. project.

Not be available when help is needed, but To attain self-interest and
be eager to take a share when there is achievement, turn the resources to
one’s purpose rather than use them in
benefit.
the right way.
Being
Pretend to be a good guy so as not to draw To protect self-power and interest, Deflection of
hypocritical
complaints, but never do what one should. pervert the goal of the project.
Goals
Dilemmas of
Playing the cards Refuse to provide or deliberately conceal Deter the project to protect
important information.
self-power and interest.
Administration
close to one’s
chest
Dilemmas of
Being a tell-tale Defame others’ images to get benefit and Deter the implementation of the
Administration,
take advantage of the power of the project and seize resources.
Diversion of
authorities in order to take control of the
Resources
best situation.
Setting terms
Set terms to swap benefits for offered Deflect the use of resources to attain Deflection of
cooperation, whether or not it is good for self-interest and achievements.
Goals,
the company.
Diversion of
Resources
Keeping within Obey the rules, policy or codes in every Deter the implementation of the
Dilemmas of
the letter of the particular way but actually make it project.
Administration
law
difficult to implement the project.
Playing dumb
Pretend to be ignorant or incompetent so Deter the implementation of the
Dilemmas of
as to avoid what they do not want to do. project.
Administration
Prolonging
Deliberately prolong the work on hand Deter the implementation of the
Dilemmas of
and appear to be so occupied that they project to prevent it from finishing on Administration
cannot contribute to the project.
time.
Stretching and
Divide the work on hand into several Deter the implementation of the
Dilemmas of
smoothing
parts, do one at a time, keep busy and project to prevent it from finishing on Administration
refuse to cooperate.
time.
Stalling
Find every pretext possible to put off Waste resources, and then delay the Dilemmas of
support. (Try to do as little as possible.) project.
Administration,
Dissipation of
Energies
Dilemmas of
Setting up a
Pay excessive attention to formal Deter the implementation of the
buffer (Red tape) documents to protect oneself. (Unless project and prevent it from finishing Administration
formal documents are provided in each on time.
step, no information will be offered.)
Diversion of
Playing safe
Avoid any unfavorable conditions. Deter the effective allocation of
Resource
Whether it is reasonable, work only for project resources.
the projects that are most likely to be
successful. Self-protection is the first
priority.
Dissipation of
White-washing To exonerate a defected policy or a failing Seize resources to gain
Energies,
action, show more commitment than self-achievement, and then waste
Diversion of
necessary and keep flinging in resources resources.
Resource
to appear confident and consistent with
the previous actions.
Dilemmas of
Staying aloof
Hold the attitude: “It is none of my Deter the implementation of the
business whether the project is successful project to prevent it from finishing Administration
or not. After all, other people have on time.
responsibility for the project.”

11. Taking a share

12.
13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

Deflection of
Goals,
Dilemmas of
Administration
Diversion of
Resources
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25. Hiding the facts Try to hide the facts and do nothing if Pervert the system goal, deter the
possible, since the boss is not familiar implementation of the system and
with the actual situations.
then delay the project.

Deflection of
Goals,
Dilemmas of
Administration
26. Old soldiers vs. Assign the difficult parts of the job to the Deter the reasonable allocation of the Dilemmas of
new boys
juniors and wait to enjoy the outcome.
project and delay the project.
Administration
27. Change leader, Stall the system they don’t like. Wait Prevent the project from going on, Dissipation of
everything is
until the leader is changed, then they are and waste the resources that have
Energies
changed
relieved of the duty.
already been put in.
28. Laying siege
If anyone disagrees, rightfully or not, ally Include out-group members, to
Deflection of
with the key men around him and try to justify the unreasonable system and Goals
persuade him.
pervert the project direction.
Dissipation of
29. Finding a
Try to find someone else to take the blame To protect self-interest, consume
Energies
scapegoat
if anything goes wrong with the system. energies in communication,
competition, and negotiation. Then
the project can't go smoothly.
30. Keeping out of the Nobody is willing to take care of the job Nobody accepts the job, for fear that Deflection of
gray areas
in the gray areas.
it will threaten their benefit, with the Goals,
result that the implementation of the Dilemmas of
Administration
project is deterred.
31. No benefit no
If the system doesn't appear personally Deflect the resource allocation to
Diversion of
effort
beneficial, deflect the job to others with attain one’s own benefit and
Resources
the pretext of insufficient manpower.
achievement.
The Classification of Political Game Effects on Projects
According to the research of Bardach (1977) we classify
the 31 political games into four categories depending on their
major adverse effects. (Table 2)
We find that the effects the same game has may fall into
different categories, which means a political game could have
more than one effect on the project.
The Relationships among Political Games, Stages of ISD,
and the Roles of Game Players.
There are three stages in ISD (Dickson & Wetherbe,
1985): IS planning stage, IS development stage and IS
implementation stage. In the different stages of ISD, what
incentives and roles do the individuals of different
departments adopt? What political games do they play? This
study has obtained the following findings. (See Table 3. “U”
in the table represents political games played by users; “M”
represents the political games played by MIS professionals.)
1. IS Planning Stage: The players include MIS
professionals and users, but we find that in this stage MIS
professionals play more games than users.
In the IS planning stage, when projects are just beginning,
all the roles, targets, and responsibilities are not clearly
defined, and both sides want to grab the power of the project.
When they get in contact with each other, the political games
begin. In this stage, the MIS department has the greater
professional power, so it can easily play games on a large
scale.

2. IS Development Stage• A great number of political
games appear; both users and MIS professionals play the
games.
In the IS development stage, the MIS department and
users interact with increasing frequency. The MIS
department needs users’ cooperation; otherwise they cannot
decide on the requirements and specification of users. So
users learn about the details of the system, and also how to
take care of their own benefit; then both of them set to work
playing many political games. But MIS professionals are
more passive instead of being active.
3. IS Implementation Stage Both MIS professionals
and users play the games, and the scores are tied.
In the IS implementation stage, which is the end of the
system development, it is getting clear who wins and who
loses as a result of implementation, who should take the
responsibility for problems, etc. And it at is this second time
that users and MIS professionals come into contact that
reward and punishment is going to be distributed. So the
political games arise again.
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Table 3 ISD stage & political games [M: MIS
professional; U: user]
Political game
Plannin Developm Impleme
g stage ent stage ntation
stage
1. Up for grabs
UM
2. Keeping others on
U
the trot
3. Leaving others in the
U
U
lurch
4. Leading an easy life UM
M
5. Providing lip service
UM
U
6. Protecting one’s
UM
UM
territory
7. Over-egging the
UM
cake
8. Boycotting
U
U
9. Passing the buck
M
UM
10. Tying two strings to
UM
one bow
11. Taking a share
U
12. Being hypocritical
M
M
13. Playing the cards
UM
close to one’s chest
14. Being a tell-tale
UM
M
15. Setting terms
M
M
16. Keeping within the
U
letter of the law
17. Playing dumb
UM
18. Prolonging
U
U
19. Stretching and
U
U
smoothing
20. Stalling
U
U
21. Setting up a buffer
U
(Red tape)
22. Playing safe
M
23. White-washing
M
M
24. Staying aloof
U
UM
25. Hiding the facts
UM
M
26. Old soldiers vs. new
M
boys
27. Change Leader,
M
M
everything is change
28. Laying siege
M
29. Finding a scapegoat
UM
30. Keeping out of the
M
M
gray areas
31.No benefit no effort
M
The Organizational Factors that Affect Political Games
Kreitner & Kinicki (1997), Robbins (1979) and
Verdenburg & Maurer (1984) all point out that under certain
kinds of organizational culture, more political games will be
introduced, for instance, when power resources are relocated,

or there is low level of trust placed in individuals. Here we try
to discover the organizational factors that can induce political
games.
1. Relocation of resources: To improve efficiency, the
organization changes the allocation of power and resources.
Ezzamel (1994) finds that in ISD the relocation of power
would induce political contests among different departments.
We find that the more the resource relocation, the more
political games are induced.
For example, when the D Company develops an
auto-operation system, this threatens many individuals’
positions, for the system might deprive them of power. So
during the interview, many odd requirements emerge and
they ask for unnecessary check-up in the system (Keeping
others on the trot), which in turn causes adverse effects on
the system.
2. Trust placed in individuals: Johnson (1995) and
Stever (1990) point out that without trust, individuals and
their organizations cannot function effectively.
We find that the higher the degree of trust in individuals, the
fewer political games are induced.
For example, interviewees of the B Company say that since
they are a financier, morality and integrity are the indispensable
qualities of new employees; hence, the organization has placed a
high degree of trust in individuals. Individuals enjoy high levels
of autonomy and authorization. Thus in the process of ISD, there
is sufficient trust between MIS professionals and users, and
relatively fewer political games arise.
3. Role ambiguity: Rizzo et al. (1970), Chenhall and
Brownell (1988), Harris (1983), Dubinsky et al. (1988) and
Liou (1995) find that role ambiguity influences job
satisfaction and performance too.
We find that the higher degree of role ambiguity, the more
political games are induced.
For instance: the network maintenance of the F Company
involves three departments: MIS, communication and user
departments (and network manufacturer). When users have
any problems, the ambiguity arises. And since these three
departments are interdependent on each other, the coverage
of ambiguity is very large, but nobody will help others. They
play the keeping out of the gray areas game even at the
expense of the mission. Hence role ambiguity could reduce
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and it could be a
good pretext to play the political game.
4. Unclear performance evaluation system: The
organization evaluates performance in a subjective way and
emphasizes a single standard for evaluation.
We find that the more unclear the performance evaluation
system, the more political games arise.
For instance, when D Company develops an
auto-operation system, in the planning and implementation
stage, some MIS professionals do not tell user departments
how to achieve the optimal performance on the grounds. That
their organization always “evaluates performance in a
subjective way” and individuals take turns getting “grade A”
for their performance. So they become less and less
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committed to their jobs. The leading an easy life game
appears and has an adverse influence on the system.
5. Zero-sum reward practices: The total amount of
reward is fixed; if you get it, then I lose it.
We find that the more zero-sum reward practices increase,
the more political games arise.
For instance, interviewees of the F Company say that in
driving EUC process, some of the users do not like to learn
the new ways of operation and do not want to take the
responsibility. All of these result from the high degree of
zero-sum. The total amount of reward and workload are fixed;
the reward is given in order of seniority; it is fruitless to do
more or better. That is why they do not like to do more
jobs--“if I don’t shirk, then they shirk.”--The leading an easy
life and stalling games appear and bring adverse effects on
the system. These situations take place when the organization
encourage individuals to use political games in order to get
the better of colleagues and show off their own performance.
6. Democratic decision-making: Individuals are
empowered to do more decision-making.
We find that the higher the degree of democratic
decision-making, the fewer political games arise.
For instance, when controversies in B Company happen,
users will exaggerate trifles, and the MIS department will
report to the higher level or the rationalization team, and after
they discuss it together, they will do anything desirable. The
whole process of decision-making is always done on the table
and democratically. Thus, political games are inhibited.
7. Self-serving senior managers (or MIS/user
department managers): Individuals will learn the political
games from the senior managers. The ambience for political
games is thus developed.
We find that the greater degree to which senior managers are
self-serving, the more political games arise.
For example, the directors of B Company (the superiors
in management) will form factions through the voting process.
Different factions have different opinions about purchase of
hardware. Seemingly, all of them are good for the company,
but they are actually playing providing lip service and
Boycotting games. Hence, they make a huge obstacle in the
adoption of ISD.
8. Member identity: Members identify with the
organization, rather than merely with their type of job.
Hofstede (1990), O’Reilly III (1991) and Boulian (1974)
point out that the more an individual identifies with the
organization, the more he will contribute and more
satisfaction he will get from his job. And in this situation
fewer political games will arise.
We find that the more an individual identifies with the
organization, the fewer political games arise.
For example, in B company, the budget for MIS is always
made by the headquarter management, but each department
can make their own evaluation in purchasing certain software.
As they have a strong sense of belonging, they will always
take the side of the organization and will not make
subreptitious budget. And no taking a share game.

9. Emphasis on team-work: Job activities are mainly
evaluated in terms of team-work rather than of individual
performance.
We find that the more emphasis on team-work, the fewer
political games arise.
For example, individuals of A Company always
emphasize the company’s benefit in advancing IS. Job
activities are always centered on team-work and performance
is evaluated in terms of team-work, too. Thus norm could be
generated easily. So MIS professionals and users can
cooperate well, and have no chance to operate political
games.
10. Risk tolerance: The organization encourages
individuals to endeavor, innovate and venture.
We find that the lower the degree of risk tolerance, the more
political games arise.
For instance, as D Company is a government enterprise,
the norm doesn’t encourage members to venture or make
innovations, so when they develop the auto-operation system,
individuals will do as little as possible. They can’t take the
risk and don’t encourage individuals to engage in the system;
hence, every individual avoids the responsibility and play
Passing the buck and leading an easy life games.
11. Means-ends
orientation:
The
organization
appreciates the result but not the processes.
We find that the more ends oriented, the more political
games are played.
For instance: the superior agency assigns D Company to
develop the auto-operation system and it is technically
feasible, but D Company doesn’t want to take trouble
(leading an easy life) and delays developing it. Now the
superior agency asks them to finish the system in five months,
so they develop a superficial auto-operation system interface
only and do not integrate all of related systems indeed.
Anyway the superior agency will not know the detailed
situation (Hiding the facts).
12. Performance pressure: The more pressure, the more
political behavior.
We find that the effect of a higher degree of performance
pressure is conditional: (1) The more ends oriented, the more
political games. (2) If both means and ends oriented, the
fewer political games are played.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
In every organization or activity there will surely be
political behavior, and it is difficult to controlled. Unlike
politics, sociology and organizational behavior, there is little
research on behaviors relative to MIS or ISD, which seems to
focus on technology. From the viewpoint of the
Socio-Technical School of thought, we need to integrate the
social and technical plans so as to reach the optimal
consequence and make the success of IS possible. Therefore,
behind the political behavior there exist many cognitive
factors, such as complex motivations, intentions, attitudes,
cultures and expectations. This means that political behavior
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is a sign, which is a key issue to be explored, understood and
analyzed by the management.
This article is an exploratory study focused on political
behavior that occurs in the process of ISD in Taiwan. With
six cases, we have achieved the following contributions to
MIS practice and research: (1) We find thirty-one types of
political games; (2) the organizational culture is really an
antecedent condition of the political games; (3) these 31
political games in six cases can be divided into four
categories depending on the games’ major adverse effects,
and the same game could have more than one effect on
the project; (4) we find the interrelationships among
political games, stages of ISD, and roles of game players.
So we assert that when an organization needs to develop
an IS project, the following organizational culture factors can
be highly effectual at reducing political behavior: (1) If the IS
project will have a high degree of resource relocation, senior
management can prevent political behavior before
development by putting in place the proper organizational
culture. (2) Reducing role ambiguity, unclear performance
evaluation, zero-sum reward practices and solely
end-oriented performance pressure in the organization will
prevent political behavior. (3) Increasing the trust placed in
individuals, democratic decision-making, member identity
with the organization, emphasis on team-work, risk tolerance,
creating a balanced means-ends orientation and emphasizing
good project procedure will result in political behavior
having no chance to breed. In the IS planning stage, the
manager should prevent MIS professionals from playing
games. In the IS development stage, the manager should
notice users playing political games, and in the IS
implementation stage, the manager should prevent both MIS
professionals and users from playing games.
As this article is merely an exploratory study, could not
generalize the results, future research is expected to be
attempted using more rigorous methods to justify these
findings. Further analyses are expected to be performed
concerning such antecedent conditions as personal factors,
and the management’s response to the game.
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